






CEP Discussion Paper No 1097 
November 2011 
HRM and Workplace Motivation: 
Incremental and Threshold Effects 
Michael White and Alex Bryson 
  
   
Abstract 
The  HRM-performance  linkage  often  invokes  an  assumption  of  increased  employee 
commitment to the organization and other positive effects of a motivational type. We present 
a  theoretical  framework  in  which  motivational  effects  of  HRM  are  conditional  on  its 
intensity, utilizing especially the idea of HRM ‘bundling’. We then analyse the association 
between HRM practices and employees’ organisational commitment (OC) and intrinsic job 
satisfaction (IJS).  HRM practices have significantly positive relationships with OC and IJS 
chiefly at high levels of implementation, but with important distinctions between the domain-
level  analysis  (comprising  groups  of  practices  for  specific  domains  such  as  employee 
development) and the across-domain or HRM-system level.  Findings  support a threshold 
interpretation of the link between HRM domains and employee motivation, but at the system-
level both incremental and threshold models receive some support. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1980s there has been considerable interest in the idea that firms can improve 
their performance by harnessing the commitment of their employees through human resource 
management (HRM) practices capable of transforming the workplace (e.g., Beer et al. 1984, 
1985; Kochan and Osterman 1994; Pfeffer 1998; Walton 1985, 1987). Despite an extensive 
literature establishing associations between HRM practices and organizational performance 
scholars have frequently pointed to difficulties in establishing a causal linkage (e.g., Cappelli 
and Neumark 2001; Guest et al. 2003; Huselid and Becker 1996; Osterman 2006; Wall and 
Wood 2005; Wright et al. 2005).  Many theories of the HRM-performance linkage rest on an 
assumption that employees have a positive motivational response to HRM practices, but this 
is rarely tested in studies concerned with firm performance. Our analysis of HRM-motivation 
linkages helps fill this gap and, if the relationship is shown to be positive, may help explain 
the  HRM-performance  relationship.  Conversely,  if  HRM  is  not  accompanied  by  higher 
employee motivation, this may stimulate interest in other plausible mechanisms.  
Three empirical studies on the HRM-motivation linkage show why more research is 
needed on this issue. The USA manufacturing study of Appelbaum et al. (2000) provides the 
locus classicus in support of a positive linear relationship between the intensity of ‘high 
performance  work  systems’  (HPWS:  a  configuration  of  HRM  focusing  on  participation, 
skills, and incentives) and measures of motivation. This study simultaneously supported a 
positive relationship between HPWS and measures of workplace performance. In parallel, 
however, Ramsay et al. (2000) were producing rather different findings from their large-scale 
British study. Using three measures of HRM systems, they reported a mixture of positive and 
negative associations across a variety of motivational outcomes. Moreover, Godard (2001), in 
a national survey of Canadian employees, found support for non-linear associations between 
a  composite  index  of  HRM  (which  he  calls  ‘alternative  work  practices’)  and  a  range  of 
motivational measures. Using a linear-quadratic specification, he showed that up to moderate 
levels of involvement in HRM, employees had positive motivational attitudes, but at high 
levels of involvement, their attitudes turned negative.  
Some recent studies support the positive and linear HRM-motivation model (Gong et 
al. 2009; Macky and Boxall 2008; Nishii et al. 2008; Takeuchi et al. 2007; 2009; Whitener 
2001 has discordant findings). However, they rely on employees’ perceptions to define HRM. 
They show that when employees have favourable perceptions of workplace practices , they 
also tend to have relatively high levels of job satisfaction, commitment, or other attitudes 
indicative  of  motivation.  A  drawback  of  these  studies  is  that  one  cannot  discount  the 
possibility  that  employee  attitudes  to  HRM  and  their  commitment  ratings  are  driven  by 
unobservable traits, such as the common influence of personality. We therefore adopt the 
approach  common  in  much  of  the  HRM-performance  literature  which  is  concerned  with 
actual organizational practices (irrespective of how viewed by employees) and their effects.  
To detect  variation in  the HRM-motivation  relationship and assess whether HRM 
constitutes an advance of universal applicability we analyse data for the whole market sector. 
We  use  the  British  Workplace  Employment  Relations  Survey  of  2004  (WERS),  which 
provides  a  national  probability  sample  of  workplaces  with  five  or  more  employees,  and 
obtains  detailed  information  on  practices  from  the  manager  responsible  for  HR  at  the 
workplace. Our measurement of HRM differs from much of the previous literature where the 
prevailing approach is to select a relatively small number of indicative practices across HRM 
domains to construct a single system-level index. Instead, and in a similar vein to Godard 
(2001) and Batt (2002), we represent variation in the intensity of HRM development, with 
measures that distinguish between low, moderate, and high levels both at the domain level 
(e.g., participatory practices) and at the across-domain or HRM-system level. The use of 2 
 
extensive, detailed, descriptive information about practices should contribute to reduction in 
measurement error and in omitted variable bias.  
Using linked employee data we calculate the mean level of motivational attitudes at 
each workplace. Assuming firms prefer motivation to be high throughout the workplace
1 this 
is an appropriate measure from the employer p olicy perspective.  The design  avoids the 
danger of common method artefact when the same respondent provides the data both on her 
own attitudes and on workplace practices (Podsakoff et al. 2003 ; Wall and Wood 2005; 
Wright et al. 2005).  
We test hypotheses which stem from the HRM-performance literature. As well as the 
familiar linear specification of the HRM -motivation relationship, we assess various non -
linear  specifications,  including  ‘threshold’  specifications  where  the  motivational  effect  of 
HRM changes at certain levels of implementation: these draw on examples or insights from 
Huselid and Becker (2006), Godard (2001), Guest et al. (2003), and Ichniowski et al. (1997). 
We  distinguish  between  (1)  a  hypothesis  of  positive  incremental  change  whereby  each 
addition to the HRM system provides an increment to employee motivation (2) a hypothesis 
that HRM practices need to be developed up to some threshold value or critical mass in order 
to achieve strong positive effects on motivation: this corresponds to the ideas of ‘bundling’ or 
‘strategic’ development of HRM that are very prominent in the HRM-performance literature; 
(3 and 4) critical views of HRM that represent it as imposing unwelcome work intensification 
on employees, which again have an incremental version (Ramsay et al 2000) and a non-linear 
or threshold version (Godard 2001). We find strong evidence of positive effects, especially of 
the  bundling/strategic  forms  of  HRM,  but  also  some  role  for  incremental  effects.  Some 
negative effects on motivational attitudes are also present but they appear to be weak. 
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2, we discuss theory and present 
hypotheses.  Section  3  presents  our  data  and  analytical  approach.  Section  4  presents  the 
results, and section 5 concludes. It should be noted at the outset that we make no claim to 
identify  causal  relationships  in  this  study;  we  use  the  terms  ‘association’  and  ‘effect’ 
interchangeably. However, the theories to which we refer are generally causal in nature, and 
we  hope  to  provide  evidence  that  will  contribute,  along  with  other  sources,  toward 
assessment of those theories. 
 
 
2.  Theory 
 
The  core  motivational  idea  connected  with  HRM-performance  research  is  simple  and 
intuitive. If people enjoy using their abilities to the full, and work harder at what they enjoy, 
they  will  be  motivated  to  perform  at  a  higher  level  when  given  the  opportunity  to  do 
challenging, enjoyable work. Walton (1972: 71) claims that ‘employees want challenge and 
personal growth’. McDuffie (1995: 201) argues that employees will only offer ‘discretionary 
effort’  if  they  believe,  among  other  things,  that  ‘the  company  will  make  a  reciprocal 
investment in their well-being’. Appelbaum et al. (2000: 46) state ‘Jobs that are challenging 
and make use of workers’ skills  are intrinsically  rewarding’.  Although the  psychological 
theory  implicit  in  such  statements  is  not  explicitly  discussed
2  they draw on  a dominant 
discourse of positive motivation around HRM. As HRM is designed to provide jobs that are 
                                                 
1 Firms might be less concerned with the motivation of employees on temporary contracts, but these form only a 
small proportion of the workforce in Britain. In any case, background investigation within the present study has 
shown that mean OC tends to be as high, or higher, in the minority of workplaces that have substantial 
proportions of temporary employees. 
2 Appelbaum et al. (2000) do discuss several motivational theories, but in an historical review of the pre-HRM 
period rather than as an explanation of the effects of high performance work systems. 3 
 
more satisfying and involving for employees  it is  natural  to assume linear increments  in 
motivation as with Appelbaum et al. (2000). But others adopt a 'bundling' or HRM-system 
view pointing to non-linear effects which occur at particular thresholds (Becker and Huselid 
2006; McDuffie 1995). A contrary position adopted by Marxian labor process theorists is that 
HRM connotes labor intensification and, as such, can have negative incremental effects (eg. 
Ramsay et al., 2000). Finally there is the non-linear model of Godard (2001) where HRM 
initially has positive effects but these turn negative at high levels of implementation due to 
work strain.  
Since the work of Foote (1951) identification has been at the center of theories of 
motivation. Where employees identify with the underlying purposes that the HRM system 
serves or contributes to
3 they are more likely to feel that HRM itself, including its control and 
coordination aspects, and its associated monitoring and measurement, is also servi ng their 
own purposes. (Gagné and Deci 2005; Akerlof and Kranton 2005).   For present purposes the 
issue is whether identification can be fostered by properties of the HRM system itself. 
The issue is further developed by Bowen and Ostroff (2004) (BO), who suggest that  HRM 
can be viewed as a communication system, and maintain that ‘HRM practices can be viewed 
as a symbolic or signalling function’ (BO: 206). If HRM is to alter employee behaviour and 
performance,  it  must  be  a  ‘strong  system’  and  the  messages  it  communicates  must  be 
persuasive.  
BO  also  emphasize  that  implementing  a  wide  range  of  practices  is  valuable  in 
strengthening the HRM message and making it salient. This is consistent with the proposition 
that impact depends on implementing collections, or ‘bundles’, of practices. This is partly, we 
suggest, because isolated practices impose little constraint on the meaning that can be given 
them.  Accordingly,  they  are  likely  to  be  interpreted  by  employees  within  established 
frameworks that (in Britain) are often antagonistic or sceptical. Extensive sets of practices, 
however, can cumulatively express new organizational values and, because they are founded 
in practice, these values may have a better chance of being accepted as genuine. In summary, 
motivation is influenced in a positive direction by sets of practices that provide opportunities 
for direct participation and voice, and that foster personal development. In combination, these 
practices encourage employees to do more and to enjoy doing it. But such opportunities are 
necessarily limited and shaped by the organization’s interests and the systems of control and 
coordination that protect those interests.  There are therefore two conflicting interpretations 
that employees can give to HRM. They can see it as an old reality in new garments; or as 
representing genuinely new values that are worth identifying with. The effect on motivation 
will depend on which of these two is the stronger. We suggest that this will vary with the 
characteristics of the HRM system, especially how intensively it has been developed.  
Our  review  of  theory  generates  two  main  hypotheses.  Hypothesis  1  is  that,  since 
HRM promotes intrinsically rewarding work, each addition to an HRM system results in 
incremental gains in employee motivation. Hypothesis 2 is that motivational effects rely on 
the  employer  signalling  a  strong  HRM  system  so  that  it  has  a  strong  positive  effect  on 
employee motivation mainly at high levels of implementation via bundling and workplace 
transformation. These hypotheses are the motivational equivalents of the main standpoints 
taken in the HRM-performance literature (Becker and Huselid 2006 seek to reconcile the 
two). These hypotheses may hold either at the practice-domain level (eg. a suite of practices 
to train and develop employees may be motivational in its own right) or perhaps only at the 
bundled HRM-system level (eg. training and development are only effectual when combined 
with other practice domains such as participation, team working and incentives). The latter 
                                                 
3 This ‘way out’ is from the viewpoint of the employer’s interest: identification processes remain open to 
critique from other viewpoints (e.g. Alvesson and Willmott 2002). 4 
 
view predominates in the HRM-performance literature but may not hold when considering 
HRM-motivation. There is also a possibility, indicated by the radical, critical school, that 
increased HRM, either incrementally or in a bundled system, may generate negative as well 
as positive motivational effects. 
 
 
3.  Data, Measures and Analysis Methods 
 
3.1  Data 
The Workplace Employment Relations Study 2004 (henceforth, WERS) is a national survey 
of workplaces with five or more employees, consisting of face-to-face interviews with the 
senior workplace manager responsible for employee relations, and a self-completion survey 
of employees. The management survey had an overall response rate of 64 per cent (N=2295). 
These face-to-face interviews last an average (mean) of 118 minutes (the median being 115 
minutes). The employee survey was conducted in the 1,967 workplaces where management 
agreed to allow a survey of workers. Questionnaires were distributed to a random sample of 
25 employees in workplaces with more than 25 workers and to all employees in workplaces 
with 5-25; employee respondents comprised a mean of 29 per cent of the total workforce per 
establishment.  The present study was confined to market sector workplaces, and the effective 
samples were 1140 workplaces with 11,854 employee respondents. 
The public-use database for WERS includes weights to account for survey design and 
non-response, and these are available on either an establishment-weighted or employment-
weighted basis for analysis of the management interviews.
4 We have used the establishment 
weights,  consistent  with  an  employer  policy  perspective.   Additionally  we  make  an 
adjustment to take account of sample attrition from absence of linked employee data in some 
cases.  
 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The  measures  relating  to  employee  motivation  are  organizational  commitment  (OC)  and 
intrinsic job satisfaction (IJS). OC is an obvious measure because of the salient position of 
the commitment concept in the literature on HRM and workplace transformation. Intrinsic 
job satisfaction is also frequently referred to in that literature, and its use can be supported 
from psychological theories of basic needs that emphasize autonomy and self-realization. As 
Gagné and Deci (2005) make clear, the underlying theory identifies motivation with need 
satisfaction.  
The  WERS  measure  of  OC  (WERS-OC)  consists  of  three  items  which  have 
counterparts  in  the  widely  used  six-item  Lincoln-Kalleberg  measure  of  affective 
organizational commitment (see Price 1997 for a history of OC measures). WERS-OC has a 
reliability (Cronbach alpha) of 0.85.  
The WERS-IJS measure has not to our knowledge previously been used although 
similar  measures  are  encountered  in  the  job  satisfaction  literature  (e.g.,  Herrbach  and 
Mignonac 2004; Morrison et al. 2005). The WERS employee questionnaire contained seven 
facet satisfaction items and from these four were selected that are similar to the ‘job itself 
intrinsic satisfaction’ subscale of Warr et al. (1979). Their reliability alpha in the survey 
sample is 0.87. A principal components analysis (Jolliffe 2004) was performed to assess the 
distinctness of WERS-OC and WERS-IJS items from each other and from other measures of 
                                                 
4 A fact-sheet can be found at: http://www.wers2004.info/FAQ.php#5 and the technical report can be 
downloaded at: http://www.wers2004.info/pdf/Vol%201%20(part%202)%20-%20Technical%20Report.pdf 5 
 
satisfaction and well-being. The results (available on request) confirmed their distinctness. 
Details of the source items and means for these variables are shown in Table 1. 
 
3.3  Measures of HRM practice 
As stressed in the introduction, we view HRM as a set of practices that, in principle, can be 
objectively described. We build up our measures from items that conform to this idea. There 
are numerous studies that have a similar approach in this respect (e.g., Cappelli and Neumark 
2001; Forth and Millward 2004; Godard 2001; Osterman 2000; 2006; Ramsey et al. 2000; 
Wright et al. 2005; Zatzick and Iverson 2006). The notion of bundling, mentioned in Section 
Two,  has  led  the  great  majority  of  researchers  to  aggregate  item-level  data  about  HRM 
practices into summative measures. The majority aggregate their items into a single overall 
measure, while others have aggregation at the level of HRM domains, such as participation or 
incentives. Our study, like Batt (2002), has aggregate variables at the domain level, but also 
overall measures which represent the across-domain or system level of HRM development.  
Where we depart from most previous research is in how HRM measures are specified 
for the analysis. Most research on HRM's links to performance and motivation has assumed 
linearity of HRM effects, which offers a way of testing the incremental effect on motivation 
but appears inconsistent with the idea of bundling.  Becker and Huselid (1998) suggest that 
additive indices be scored positively only when they reach some cut-off level, such as the 75
th 
percentile. A few studies have adopted threshold-based measures along these lines (Guest et 
al. 2003; Huselid and Becker 1996; Ichniowski et al. 1997).  
We construct measures of HRM that represent a wide range of intensity. To achieve 
this, we used 71 items concerning HRM practice from the managerial interview schedule, 
focusing on seven domains of practice that are commonly regarded as elements of an HRM 
system (see later). We did not require every item to refer to practice across all employees. In 
WERS, many items refer to the ‘largest occupational group’ of employees, and some apply to 
‘non-managerial’ employees; both these, we judge, provide a reasonable indication of general 
HRM practice. We excluded, however, items that related only to managerial employees. (The 
full set of items is available from the authors as an Appendix Table). 
Most of the source items were binary; others that had more complex scoring were 
reduced to binary form. This differs from most US studies of HRM, which have used Likert-
scale type source items, or quantified estimates.  Binary items have a restricted range  by 
comparison with ordinal, interval, or ratio scales, and this may bias estimates conservatively 
toward  zero.  Binary  items  however  also  tend  to  reduce  measurement  error  that  may  be 
present  in  the  rating  scales.  So  far,  HRM  research  using  binary  source  items  (including 
numerous British studies using the WERS 1998 and 2004 surveys, e.g. Forth and Millward 
2004, Kinnie et al. 2006, Ramsay et al. 2000; see also Wright et al. 2005 for a US study; 
Zatzick and Iverson 2006 for Canada) have not suffered from inadequate precision.  
The allocation of HRM practices to domains was conventional and largely followed 
the grouping of HRM questions in the survey questionnaires which in turn reflected common 
understanding of practice in Britain. The items were initially grouped on this basis into seven 
domains,  labelled  participation,  development,  teams,  incentives,  recruitment,  equal 
opportunities,  and  family-friendly  practice  (Table  2).  The  first  five  of  these  presumably 
require no further explanation, since they occur repeatedly in the literature of HRM. Equal 
opportunities practices are included to represent fair treatment, and similarly family-friendly 
practices  represent  the  employer’s  caring  attitude.  Although  not  directly  relevant  to 
performance, these two domains of practice are widely recognized as part of HRM practice in 
Britain  and  should  contribute  positively  toward  the  overall  HRM  climate  (Bloom  et  al., 
2011). 6 
 
Job  design  is  not  treated  as  a  domain,  but  relevant  items  are  included  under 
participation, development, and teams. The grouping of items was checked and adjusted by 
means of reliability analysis (see Table 2). The Kuder-Richardson reliabilities (closely similar 
to Cronbach alpha) were in the range 0.63-0.79, except in the case of recruitment (0.52), 
where the set of items available is somewhat limited. These reliabilities for HRM domain 
measures are similar to those found in the US HRM-performance literature when descriptive 
reports  of  practice  are  obtained.  Four  items  of  the  original  71,  relating  to  long-term 
employment and job security protection were found not to group well as a domain, and were 
accordingly removed from the aggregated measures, but retained as ‘loose’ practices, in view 
of the importance attached to security policy in many discussions of HRM (e.g. Kochan and 
Osterman 1994). We also included a measure of the form of employee consultation over 
workplace change, which proved not to group with any domain. 
The basic domain scores were formed as the unweighted sums of the binary items.
 5 
These scores were either used on their own with an interval-scale assumption, or collapsed to 
derive dummy variables for each domain (a) above the weighted median score, versus at or 
below the median, (b) the nearest fit to the weighted 80
th percentile score, versus below 80
th 
percentile.  We  will  refer  to  these  as  ‘upper’  and  ‘high’  scores,  respectively.  The  80
th 
percentile cut was selected as the nearest cut that always yielded a measure that was distinct 
from the median cut; it approximates the 75
th percentile cut used by Huselid and Becker 
(1996).  Using  these  cuts,  we  next  constructed  a  3-valued  measure  for  each  domain, 
distinguishing between low, moderate and high levels of implementation. To represent the 
across-domain or ‘HRM-system’ view, we constructed two further types of measures. One 
summed the number of domains that were at the ‘upper’ level / the ‘high’ level. The other 
summed the items (practices) across domains into an overall index; this corresponds to the 
practice of many US studies. 
 
3.4  Control variables 
Control variables are included in all the reported analyses. They are: administrative region 
(11  dummies),  the  rank  of  travel-to-work  area  unemployment  rate  in  2004,  the  natural 
logarithm of number of workplace  employees,  a four-category dummy indicating size of 
organization (with single site organization as reference category), industry (12 dummies), the 
percentage of workplace employees in ‘higher’ (professional and managerial) occupations, 
the  percentage  in  ‘intermediate’  (administrative,  technician  and  craft)  occupations,  the 
percentage  of  female  employees,  five-banded  percentage  of  employees  in  non-permanent 
jobs, and a dummy for presence of recognised union(s).  
 
3.5  Analyses 
We use survey regression with a robust variance estimator. We describe how hypotheses are 
represented in different model specifications in Section Four below. The measures of OC and 
IJS are treated as continuous variables, since they are smoothly distributed workplace means. 
The main technical issue concerns the fact that the means of OC and IJS are themselves 
sample-based  estimates:  therefore  measured  with  error,  and  heteroskedastic  because  the 
workplace samples vary in size. However, as OC and IJS are always dependent variables, 
measurement error is  incorporated in  the usual disturbance term  and this  does  not affect 
consistency of estimates. The robust variance estimator allows for heteroskedasticity as well 
as for weighting and stratification.  
                                                 
5 We also experimented with ordinal variables, available in WERS, relating to participation (two variables), 
development (two items), teams (one item), and incentives (one item). Using these in place of the main 
constructed measures for these domains, and treating them either as interval-scale measures or categorical 
measures, we found that none was statistically significant.  7 
 
4.  Results 
 
First we report the results of analyses at the HRM-domain level: these are the building blocks 
for an overall HRM policy. We then proceed to the results of analyses at the across-domain 
level, where the explanatory variables sum the extent of development for sets of domains: 
these are measures of overall HRM intensity, and correspond to the overall indices of practice 
that have been the predominant approach in the HRM-performance literature.  All analyses 
include the set of control variables described in Section 3.4 but the estimates for the control 
variables are not shown in the tables. We do not show tables of specifications where all or 
nearly all estimates for the HRM variables are non-significant ( any tables referred to but not 
shown are available on request from the authors.) We also omit the estimates for the ‘loose’ 
practices  relating  to  long-term  employment  and  security,  since  these  have  chiefly  non-
significant effects across all specifications. 
 
4.1  Domain-level analyses 
First we ran a specification with additive domain scores treated as interval measures.  The 
estimates  are  therefore  of  the  independent  linear  effects  of  each  domain.  This  analysis 
represents at the HRM-domain level the hypothesis that the effects of HRM practices are 
incremental, with any increase in the extent of practices in any domain having a positive 
effect on motivation. None of these linear effects was significant at the five per cent level, 
either when OC or IJS was the dependent variable; one (for the incentives domain) was 
significant at the 10 per cent level, with IJS as the dependent variable. There is therefore little 
support at the domain level for the incremental-effect hypothesis. We also ran a specification 
with the square of each domain score in addition to the linear term. With OC as the outcome, 
the model F statistic fell from 6.67 to 5.66, and with IJS as the outcome, from 5.46 to 5.14, 
suggesting no improvement in the model. One domain measure, selection, showed marked 
non-linearity across both outcomes: for OC, a linear effect on OC of -0.513 (standard error 
0.169), and quadratic effect 0.066 (standard error 0.021), and the corresponding effects on IJS 
of -0.527 (s.e. 0.224) and 0.064 (s.e. 0.026).  There was also some evidence of non-linearity 
for the development domain for the OC outcome, the quadratic term having an effect of 0.019 
with standard error 0.009; the linear parameter estimate was non-significant. Although the 
remaining domain estimates were non-significant, six of the seven domains had a negative 
sign on the linear term and positive sign on the quadratic term.  
We next turn to specifications where each HRM-domain score is dichotomized at a 
threshold value. For the first set of results the contrast is between workplaces in the ‘upper’ 
half of each score versus those in the lower half, while the second set gives results between 
workplaces in approximately the top quintile of the score distribution versus those below this 
threshold. When ‘upper’ (above median) dummies were used to represent each domain, none 
of  these  dummies  had  a  significantly  positive  coefficient  at  the  ten  per  cent  level;  team 
organization had a significantly  negative  coefficient (at  the 10 per cent level). However, 
when  ‘high’  (at/above  80
th  percentile)  dummies  were  used  for  each  domain,  four  of  the 
dummies – those for development, participation, incentives, and teams – were significant at 
least at the 10 per cent level either with OC or with IJS.  This evidence is not strong, but 
gives some suggestion that the effects of HRM on motivation appear mainly when a high 
intensity of practices has been reached in certain domains thus supporting the importance of 
‘bundling’. However, the coefficient for ‘high’ team practices was negative in both the OC 
and IJS models, and significant at the 10 per cent level in the former.  We do not show this 
table since the next analysis step provides a clearer view of the results. 
This next step employs a 3-valued variable taking value 0 when the domain score is 
‘low’ (up to and including the median level), value 1 when it is ‘moderate’ (above the median 8 
 
level but below the 80
th percentile level), and value 2 when it is ‘high’ (at/above the 80
th 
percentile).
6  Table 3 shows the resulting estimates, highlighting those for the four HRM 
domains that had significant estimates. To interpret the estimates quantitatively,  in this and 
subsequent tables, note that the dependent variables are measured in units of  the attitudinal 
response, so the coefficient is the  difference  in the attitudinal mean per workplace as a 
proportion of a unit of response.  
For three domains (development, participation, and incentives)  a ‘high’ score was 
associated with significantly higher mean OC than for a ‘moderate’ score. These are just the 
domains  whose  importance  was  underlined  by  Appelbaum  et  al.  (2000).  For  the  teams 
domain, the difference was again marked between a ‘high’ and ‘moderate’ score but this time 
in a negative direction. Differences between ‘high’ and ‘low’ were generally less clear than 
between  ‘high’ and ‘moderate’.  This  pattern was  less clear when  IJS  was  the dependent 
variable, with only two of the domains – participation and incentives – showing significant 
differences  between  the  ‘high’  and  ‘moderate’  levels.  Overall,  however,  there  is  some 
indication here that a merely ‘moderate’ level of HRM implementation at the domain level 
has little motivational return for the employer; the ‘bundling’ of HRM practices is shown to 
be important at the within-domain level.  
 
4.2  Across-domain analyses 
As explained in Section 3, the across-domain analyses are based on two kinds of summative 
variable representing overall HRM-system development. First we consider summation of the 
dummies indicating whether the workplace is at the ‘upper’ level on each domain, or again 
those indicating whether the workplace is at the ‘high’ level. Thus, across the seven domains, 
there are two alternative scores of 0-7. It may also be argued that two of the domains – family 
friendly practices and equal opportunities practices – are not usually considered as part of 
‘high performance’ HRM (e.g., as considered in Appelbaum et al. 2000), and their inclusion 
may dampen the impact of across-domain HRM on motivational outcomes. Indeed, these two 
domains never had significant effects in the domain-level analyses. In recognition of this 
objection, we also compute sum variables that omit family-friendly and equal opportunities 
domains. These summative indices which we label ‘HR/HP’ therefore take values 0-5. When 
these HR/HP indices are used, the omitted domains are still present in the specification as 
separate dummy variables. 
Initially we consider these indices as interval measures and estimate linear effects. As 
noted before, this specification represents an hypothesis of incremental effect at the across-
domain level here meaning that each additional domain that is developed to the specified 
level yields a corresponding increase on the motivational measure.  In the upper panel of 
Table 4, we show the linear trend effects of the indices of ‘high’ development of domains 
(the corresponding effects for the indices of ‘upper’ level development are not shown as they 
are always non-significant). Those at the ‘high’ level are always positive and significant at 
the 10 per cent or 5 per cent level. These results support an incremental hypothesis inasmuch 
as each additional domain that is developed to a ‘high’ level contributes toward improved 
motivational outcomes. Note that the linear trend estimates are considerably higher when 
analysis is focused on the 5 HR/HP domains rather than considered across all 7 domains. 
We next investigated non-linearity of the across-domain effects by adding a quadratic 
term, the square of the index in question, to the linear trend specification.  We do not report 
the results from these models as the coefficients on both linear and quadratic terms were 
                                                 
6 We also constructed 4-value variables where the ‘low’ category was further divided between workplaces in 
approximately the lowest third of each domain’s score distribution, and those above this but below the cut-off 
between ‘low’ and ‘moderate’. We do not report results from analyses using this version since they did not yield 
much further information. 9 
 
generally non-significant. Additionally, in case the interval scale assumption is too strong for 
these  measures  of  across-domain  practice,  we  ran  further  models  with  the  measures 
represented as categorical by means of dummies for each step on the index. The lower panel 
of Table 4 shows the estimates from this more flexible specification. Testing the ‘flexible’ 
estimates  against linear  model predictions (by  means  of Wald  tests) failed to  reveal any 
statistically significant  departures  from  linearity. However this  specification does  provide 
some further insight. Although at the domain level (Table 3) only three domains were found 
to have significant and positive effects on OC or IJS, at the across-domain level there are 
progressively higher effects on motivational attitudes for four, five and all the way up to 
seven  domains  developed  to  the  ‘high’  level.  This  suggests  that  the  other  domains  also 
contribute at the HRM-system level. 
Overall,  the  foregoing  results  provide  support  for  the  incremental  hypothesis 
concerning the effects of HRM practices at the across-domain or system level. However, we 
have to bear in mind that the linear trend is found only when indexing domains that have been 
developed to the ‘high’ level, a level that applies to only the ‘top’ quintile of workplaces in 
each domain.  
Further, it may be that the restricted range of the summed-domain variables (0-7 or 0-
5) makes it hard to identify non-linearities. Accordingly, as noted in Section Four, we have 
also created across-domain measures by summing the individual practices across all seven 
HRM (variable label TOTHRM) or all five HR/HP domains (variable label TOTHRHP). This 
generates indices with much extended range (see Table 2). These variables include practices 
from domains that are developed only to a low or moderate level alongside those from ‘high’ 
domains, but of course summed-practice scores are strongly associated with across-domain 
counts of ‘high’ development.  
Table  5  summarizes  the  chief  results.  With  a  linear  trend  representation  of  the 
summed-practice measures, the estimates are non-significant for both IJS and OC. When a 
quadratic term is added, both the linear and quadratic terms are significant at least at the 5 per 
cent level for OC regressed on TOTHRHP, and for IJS regressed either on TOTHRM or 
TOTHRHP. For OC regressed on TOTHRM, the quadratic term is positive and significant 
while the linear term is negative but non-significant. 
In these specifications, the linear term always has negative sign while the quadratic 
term always has positive sign. This suggests that workplaces implementing HRM practices or 
the HR/HP subset to a moderate extent tend to meet on average somewhat negative responses 
in terms of employee OC and IJS, but this tendency is reversed as the implementation reaches 
higher  levels.  With  the  HR/HP  summed-practice  measures,  OC  is  predicted  to  reach  a 
minimum at about 15 practices, and thereafter to increase progressively (The mean marginal 
predictions, with control variables at their observed values, are plotted in  Figure 1). The 
minimum of IJS is similarly reached at 15 HRHP practices, or at 20 HRM practices, with 
progressive increases thereafter (Figure 2) . 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
A  positive association between HRM  practices  and business  performance has often  been 
explained  via  HRM’s  assumed  effect  on  employee  motivation.  Yet  evidence  for  this 
assumption remains scanty and is not wholly consistent. Also, little use has been made of the 
major insights of the HRM-performance literature concerning the importance of ‘bundling’, 
that is of highly developed or intensive HRM systems: the suggestion has been that major 
effects on performance can only be achieved through workplace transformation, and this is 
suggestive of non-linear or threshold effects on motivational outcomes. We have pointed to 10 
 
further  theoretical  arguments  that  HRM’s  effects  on  employees  will  depend  not  only  on 
specific opportunities for participation and personal development, but also on whether the 
HRM practices in total communicate a transformative development that evokes employee 
identification.  
Using  linked  employer-employee  data  for  Britain  we  find  no  evidence  that 
incremental  investments  in  domain-level  HRM  elicit  incremental  increases  in  employee 
motivation.  Instead,  domain-level  effects  tend  to  appear  only  when  a  high  intensity  of 
practices has been reached within a domain. Positive and significant effects are found for 
‘high’ implementation of the developmental, participatory, and incentive domains but the 
motivational  effect  of  intensive  team-working  is  negative.  At  the  HRM  system-level  the 
estimated relationships differ across two kinds of HRM measure. Counting HRM domains 
that  have  reached  threshold  values,  we  find  that  OC  and  IJS  increase  linearly  as  more 
domains  are  developed  to  a  ‘high’  level.  Counting  practices  across  domains,  and  hence 
including practices from less-developed as well as highly-developed domains, we find that 
workplaces  with  limited  implementation  of  HRM  practices  initially  meet  on  average 
somewhat negative responses in terms of employee OC and IJS, but this tendency is reversed 
as the implementation becomes more extensive, supporting the contention that employers 
must  signal  "strongly"  to  employees  through  their  HRM  system  if  they  are  to  reap  the 
rewards of improved employee motivation. The pattern of findings also makes it hard to 
argue that HRM’s apparent effects are spurious, with workplaces self-selecting into HRM 
when they have well-motivated employees. In that case, workplaces with moderate levels of 
HRM implementation would also show positive effects on OC and IJS. 
These  findings  have  practical  implications  for  firms.  Low  levels  of  HRM 
implementation appear to be of little motivational value, at least in the British context where 
relationships  are  often  adversarial.  But  there  is  value  in  firms  developing  each  selected 
domain to a high or ‘transformative’ level since each gives a separate motivational payoff. 
Then, as more domains are transformed, there will be further incremental gains in the form of 
more motivational payoff from having a more extensive system. 
This research spans the whole market sector in Britain, so its findings have wide 
generality.  However,  there  would  also  be  interest  in  disaggregated  analyses  to  examine 
variations in the effects of HRM for workplaces of different size, for instance. The main 
limitation of the present research is its use of a single cross-section . We are therefore unable 
to consider motivational dynamics, such as latency or persistence. This limitation may be 





Akerlof, G.A. and Kranton, R.E. (2005) ‘Identity and the economics of organizations’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19: 9-32. 
 
Appelbaum, E., Bailey, T., Berg, P. and Kalleberg, A.L. (2000) Manufacturing Advantage: 
Why High-Performance Work Systems Pay Off, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Batt, R. (2002) ‘Managing customer services: Human resource practices, quit rates, and sales 
growth’, Academy of Management Journal, 45: 587-97. 
 
Becker, B.E. and Huselid, M.A. (1998) ‘High performance work systems and firm 
performance: A synthesis of research and managerial implications’. In Ferris, G.R. 
(ed.) Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, Vol. 16, Stamford, 
CT: JAI Press. 
 
--- --- (2006) ‘Strategic human resources management: where do we go from here?’, Journal 
of Management, 32: 898-925. 
 
Beer, M., Spector, B., Lawrence, P.R., Mills, Q.D., and Walton, R.E. (1984) Managing 
Human Assets, New York: Free Press. 
 
---. (1985) Human Resource Management: A General Manager's Perspective. New York: 
Free Press. 
 
Bloom, N., Kretschmer, T. and Van Reenen, J. (forthcoming) ‘Are family-friendly workplace 
practices a valuable firm resource?’, Strategic Management Journal 
 
Bowen, D.E. and Ostroff, C. (2004) ‘Understanding HRM-performance linkages: The role of 
the “strength” of the HRM system’, Academy of Management Review, 29: 203-21. 
 
Cappelli, P. and Neumark, D. (2001) ‘Do “high performance” work practices improve 
establishment-level outcomes?’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 54: 737-75. 
  
Foote, N. N. (1951) ‘Identification as the basis for a theory of motivation’, American 
Sociological Review, 16, 1: 14-21 
 
Forth, J. and Millward, N. (2004) ‘High-involvement management and pay in Britain’, 
Industrial Relations, 43: 98-119. 
 
Gagné, M. and Deci, E.L. (2005) ‘Self-determination theory and work motivation’, Journal 
of Organizational Behavior, 26: 331-62. 
 
--- (2004) ‘A critical assessment of the high performance paradigm’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 42: 349-78. 
  
Gong, Y., Law, K.S., Chang, S. and Xin, K.R. (2009) ‘Human resources management and 
firm performance: The differential role of managerial affective and continuance 
commitment’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 94: 263-75. 
 12 
 
Guest, D., Michie, J., Conway, N. and Sheehan, M. (2003) ‘Human resource management 
and corporate performance in the UK’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41: 
291-314. 
 
Herrbach, D. and Mignonac, K. (2004). ‘How organisational image affects employee 
attitudes’, Human Resource Management Journal, 14: 76-88. 
 
Huselid, M.A. and Becker, B.E. (1996) ‘Methodological issues in cross-sectional and panel 
estimates of the human resource – firm performance link’, Industrial Relations, 35: 
400-22. 
 
Ichniowski, C., Shaw, K. and Prennushi, G. (1997) ‘The effects of human resource 
management practices on productivity: A study of steel finishing lines’, American 
Economic Review, 87: 171-88. 
 
Jolliffe, I. T. (2004) Principal Components Analysis (2
nd. edn.) New York: Springer. 
 
Kinnie, N., Hutchison, S., Purcell, J., Rayton, B. and Swart, J. (2006) ‘Satisfaction with HR 
practices and commitment to the organisation: Why one size does not fit all’, Human 
Resource Management Journal, 15, 9-29. 
 
Kochan, T.A. and Osterman, P. (1994) The Mutual Gains Enterprise, Harvard Business 
School Press. 
 
McDuffie, J.P. (1995) ‘Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance: 
Organizational logic and flexible production systems in the world auto industry’, 
Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 48: 197-221. 
 
Macky, K. and Boxall, P. (2008) ‘High-involvement work processes, work intensification and 
employee well-being: A study of New Zealand work experiences’, Asia Pacific 
Journal of Human Resources, 46: 38-55. 
 
Morrison, D., Cordery, J., Girardi, A. and Payne, R. (2005) ‘Job design, opportunities for 
skill utilisation, and intrinsic job satisfaction’, European Journal of Work and 
Organizational Psychology, 14: 59-79. 
 
Nishii, L.H., Lepak, D.P. and Schneider, B. (2008) ‘Employee attributions of the “why” of 
HR practices: Their effects on employee attitudes and behaviors, and customer 
satisfaction’, Personnel Psychology, 61: 503-45. 
 
Osterman, P. (2000) ‘Work reorganization in an era of restructuring: trends in diffusion and 
effects on employee welfare’, Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 53: 179-96. 
 
--- (2006) ‘The wage effects of high performance work organization in manufacturing’, 
Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 59: 187-204. 
 
Pfeffer, J. (1998). The Human Equation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 13 
 
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee, J.-Y., and Podsakoff, N.P. (2003) ‘Common method 
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended 
remedies’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 88: 879-903. 
 
Price, J.L. (1997) ‘Handbook of organizational measurement’, International Journal of 
Manpower, 18: 303-553. 
 
Ramsay, H., Scholarios, D. and Harley, B. (2000) ‘Employees and high-performance work 
systems: Testing inside the black box’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 38: 
501-32. 
 
Takeuchi, R., Lepak, D.P., Wang, H. and Takeuchi, K. (2007) ‘An empirical examination of 
the mechanisms mediating between high-performance work systems and the 
performance of Japanese organizations’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 92: 1069-83. 
 
-- , Chen, G. and Lepak, D.P. (2009) ‘Through the looking glass of a social system: cross-
level effects of high-performance work systems on employees’ attitudes’, Personnel 
Psychology, 62: 1-29. 
 
Wall, T.D. and Wood, S.J. (2005) ‘The romance of human resource management and 
business performance, and the case for big science’, Human Relations, 58: 429-62. 
 
Walton, R.E. (1972) ‘How to counter alienation in the plant’, Harvard Business Review, 72 
No. 6: 70-81. 
 
-- (1985) ‘From control to commitment in the workplace’, Harvard Business Review, 85 No. 
2: 77-84. 
 
---. (1987) Innovating to Compete, London: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Warr, P., Cook, J. and Wall, T. (1979) ‘Scales for the measurement of some work attitudes 
and aspects of psychological well-being’, Journal of Occupational Psychology, 52: 
129-48. 
 
Whitener, E.M. (2001) ‘Do “high commitment” human resource practices affect employee 
commitment? A cross-level analysis using hierarchical linear modelling’, Journal of 
Management, 27: 515-35. 
 
Wright, P.M., Gardner, T.M., Moynihan, L.M. and Allen, M.R. (2005) ‘The relationship 
between HR practices and firm performance: examining causal order’, Personnel 
Psychology, 58: 409-46. 
 
Zatzick, C.D. and Iverson, R.D. (2006) ‘High-involvement management and workforce 
reduction: Competitive advantage or disadvantage?’, Academy of Management 






Table 1. Organizational Commitment (OC) and Intrinsic Job Satisfaction (IJS) 
 
OC items: To what extent do you agree or disagree …  Values 
taken 
Workplace mean  Workplace s.d. 
I share many of the values of my organization   
-2 … 2 
0.4776  0.4773 
I feel loyal to my organization  0.7924  0.4730 
I am proud to tell people who I work for  0.6482  0.5451 
OC summative measure  -6 … 6  1.932  1.370 
IJS items: How satisfied are you with …   
 
1 … 5 
   
The sense of achievement you get from your work  3.752  0.4551 
The scope for using your own initiative  3.823  0.4203 
The amount of influence you have over your job  3.591  0.4612 
The work itself  3.767  0.4408 




Table 2. Measurement of Human Resource Management (HRM) Practices 
 
Domain measures 





















Development  11  4  45  7  21  0.73 
Participation  11  3  49  7  22  0.79 
Teams   7  2  47  4  18  0.69 
Incentives   8  1  34  3  22  0.68 
Recruitment   7  4  44  5  17  0.52 
Family-
friendly 
10  2  44  4  24  0.63 
Equal 
opportunities 
13  0  48  2  22  0.79 
Across-domain measures 
Label  No. of domains  Mean
e  Standard deviation
e 
HRM ‘upper’
c  7  4.184  1.981 
HRM ‘high’
c  7  2.338  1.875 
HR/HP
d ‘upper’
c  5  2.979  1.516 
HR/HP
d ‘high’
c  5  1.560  1.377 
TOTHRM=sum ofHRM practices  7  24.64  10.20 
TOTHRHP= sum of HR/HP practices  5  19.69   7.73 
       
a Category that includes the median / nearest fit to 80
th percentile for the domain, from weighted distribution, 
within the market sector, of each domain score. 
b Kuder-Richardson reliability measure for binary items; it returns closely similar estimates to Cronbach alpha. 
c Upper=no. of domains that score above median, high=no. of domains that score at or above the 80
th percentile, 
whichever yields nearer approximation to top 20% of distribution. 
d HR/HP is the ‘high performance’ subset obtained by omitting family-friendly and equal opportunities domains. 
e These are unweighted sample statistics. 






Table 3. OC and IJS regressed on 3-level variable for each HRM domain: survey 
regression estimates (t-statistics below)  
 
dependent variable >>  OC  IJS 
HRM variable  v.’low’  v. ‘moderate’  v. ‘low’  v.’moderate’ 
development ‘high’   0.380  0.438  0.334  0.345 
(2.06)*  (2.32)*  (1.45)  (1.39) 
participation ‘high’  0.156  0.343  0.377  0.349 
(0.89)  (2.10)*  (1.54)  (1.91)+ 
teams ‘high’  0.178  -0.370  -0.420  -0.081 
(1.25)  (2.24)*  (1.96)*  (0.40) 
incentives ‘high’  0.182  0.411  0.377  0.450 
(1.14)  (2.08)*  (2.10)*  (1.97)* 
selection ‘high’  0.171  0.176  -0.027  0.119 
(0.96)  (1.02)  (0.14)  (0.56)* 
family-friendly ‘high’  0.161  0.142  -0.156  -0.016 
(1.05)  (0.78)  (0.77)  (0.08) 
equal opportunities ‘high’  -0.077  -0.058  -0.144  0.064 
(0.46)  (0.32)  (0.69)  (0.28) 
Note: The columns show results from separate analyses varying the reference value for the HRM-domain 
variables. 
+ significant at the 10 per cent level * significant at the 5 per cent level or above. All analyses are based on a 





Table 4. OC and IJS regressed on indices of ‘high’ domains: estimates (t-statistics 
below) from linear and flexible specifications 
 
   HRM  HR/HP 
dependent variable >>  OC  IJS  OC  IJS 
(a) Linear (HRM , HR/HP interval scale)  0.116  0.102  0.154  0.173 
  2.30*  1.89+  2.34*  2.25* 
(b)Flexible (HRM, HR/HP dummies)         
1 domain at ‘high’ level  0.161  0.314  0.052  0.101 
  (0.94)  (1.52)  (0.17)  (0.52) 
2 domains  0.397  0.374  0.282  0.408 
  (1.99)*  (1.30)  (1.54)  (1.61) 
3 domains  0.178  0.126  0.535  0.399 
  (0.70)  (0.44)  (2.11)*  (1.35) 
4 domains  0.363  0.420  0.527  0.736 
  (1.13)  (1.34)  (1.50)  (2.32)* 
5 domains  0.733  0.618  1.218  1.130 
  (2.60)*  (1.98)*  (3.31)*  (2.45)* 
6 domains  0.838  1.025     
  (2.92)*  (2.83)*     
7 domains at ‘high’ level  1.285  1.250     
  (3.02)*  (2.41)*     









Table 5. Estimates from regressions of OC and IJS on summed-practice variables. Cell 
entries are the estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets 
 
  OC    IJS   
model >>  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Total HRM – 
linear 
0.010 (0.009)  -0.039 (0.032)  0.0063 (0.0113)  -0.0753 (0.0357) * 
Total HRM – 
squared 
-  0.0012 (0.0008)+  -  0.0019 (0.0007) ** 
Total HR/HP – 
linear 
0.01456 (0.01125)  -0.014 (0.0398)**  0.012 (0.014)  -0.1576 (0.0451) ** 
Total HR-HP- 
squared 
-  0.00364 (0.00106) **  -  0.0052 (0.0012) ** 















Appendix Table. HRM items and domains 
 
Note: Further details available on request. LOG=largest occupational group. 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
Meaning of item  groups 
Investor in People standard  all 
employee development part of strategic planning  all 
induction courses  LOG 
proportion getting off-job training is above median for occupational group  LOG 
proportion getting cross-job training is above median for occupational group  LOG 
range of types of training given is above median for occupational group  LOG 
training for team working  LOG 
training discussed in briefing groups  all 
appraisal for all non-managers  non-managers 
appraisal across all occupational groups   all 
PARTICIPATION 
Meaning of item  groups 
discussion time in meetings with management above median  all 
discussion time in line briefings above median  all 
work organization discussed in briefings  all 
production discussed in briefings  all 
employment discussed in briefings  all 
finance discussed in briefings  all 
planning discussed in briefings  all 
pay discussed in briefings  all 
consultative committee  all 
any business changes that involve employees  all 
attitude survey  all 
TEAMS 
Meaning of item  groups 
proportion in teams is above median for occupational group  LOG 
team members are inter-dependent  LOG 
tasks rotate in team  LOG 
teams decide how to do the work  LOG 
teams have specific area of responsibility  LOG 
teams choose own leader  LOG 
quality circles or problem-solving groups  all 
INCENTIVES 
Meaning of item  groups 
individual incentive  all 
team incentive  all 
workplace incentive  all 
organizational incentive  all 
incentives increase pay differentials   LOG 
appraisal increases pay differentials  LOG 
merit pay or payment by results used  all 






Meaning of item  groups 
selection based on skill  all 
selection based on qualifications  all 
selection based on experience  all 
selection based on motivation  all 
selection based on references   all 
personality tests in selection  all 
competence or performance tests  all 
FAMILY-FRIENDLY 
Meaning of item  groups 
working from home permitted  all 
job sharing  all 
flexible hours  all 
term-time contract  all 
workplace creche  all 
financial aid for childcare  all 
paid paternity leave  all 
leave available for elder care  all 
part-time option for all employees  all 
longer hours option  all 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND DIVERSITY 
Meaning of item  groups 
equal opportunities training  LOG 
equal opportunities discussed in meetings  all 
eq.op. recruitment monitored  all 
eq.op. recruitment reviewed  all 
eq.op. promotion monitored  all 
eq.op. promotion reviewed  all 
eq.op. pay monitored  all 
formal eq.op. policy is checked  all 
try to recruit women returners  all 
try to recruit ethnic minorities  all 
try to recruit older workers  all 
try to recruit people with disabilities  all 
try to recruit from unemployment  all 
Additional items not included in HRM domains (‘loose’ items) 
Meaning of item  groups 
types of employee involvement in change
a  all 
job security / no compulsory redundancy  all 
vacancies internally filled  all 
pay for long service  LOG 
occupational pension  LOG 
‘other’ incentive  all 
selection based on fitting into team
b  all 
selection based on commitment
b  all 
a Four dummies: employees were informed, were consulted, negotiated, decided (reference no involvement). 
b Additional backcoded response to source item. 
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